Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1026 of 21 June 2021 in support of the Cyber Security and Resilience and Information Assurance Programme of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Grade B
mapped from publisher markup. A grade says how a document's structure was obtained, not how reliable the law is.
Address https://gelex.eu/eli/EU/decision/2021/1026@2021-06-21/en
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 28(1) and 31(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) On 12 December 2003 the European Council adopted the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (the EU Strategy), Chapter III of which contains a list of measures to combat such proliferation.
(2) The EU Strategy underlines the crucial role of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC) and of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in creating a world free of chemical weapons. The objectives of the EU Strategy are complementary to those pursued by the OPCW in the context of its responsibility for the implementation of the CWC.
(3) On 22 November 2004 the Council adopted Joint Action 2004/797/CFSP on support for OPCW activities. That Joint Action was followed on its expiry by Council Joint Action 2005/913/CFSP, which in turn was followed by Council Joint Action 2007/185/CFSP. Joint Action 2007/185/CFSP was followed by Council Decisions 2009/569/CFSP, 2012/166/CFSP, 2013/726/CFSP, (CFSP) 2015/259, (CFSP) 2017/2302, (CFSP) 2017/2303 and (CFSP) 2019/538.
(4) The continuation of such intensive and targeted assistance from the Union to the OPCW is necessary in the context of the active implementation of Chapter III of the EU Strategy.
(5) There is a need for further Union support for the Cyber Security and Resilience and Information Assurance Programme of the OPCW, which aims to enhance the capacity of the OPCW to maintain appropriate levels of cyber security and resilience in addressing current and emerging challenges related to cyber security,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Article 1
1. For the purpose of giving immediate and practical application to certain elements of the EU Strategy, the Union shall support a project of the OPCW with the following objectives:
upgrading ICT infrastructure in line with the OPCW’s institutional business continuity framework, with a strong focus on resilience, and
ensuring privileged access governance, as well as physical, logical and cryptographic information management and separation for all strategic and mission networks of the OPCW.
2. In the context of paragraph 1, the Union-supported activities of the project of the OPCW, which are in compliance with the measures set out in Chapter III of the EU Strategy, shall be the following:
operationalisation of an enabling environment for ongoing cyber security and resilience efforts within multi-site OPCW operations,
designing of customised solutions for on-premises and cloud-based system integration and configuration with OPCW ICT systems and privileged access management (PAM) solutions, and
initiation and testing of PAM solutions.
3. A detailed description of the Union-supported activities of the OPCW referred to in paragraph 2 is set out in the Annex.
Article 2
1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the HR) shall be responsible for the implementation of this Decision.
2. Technical implementation of the project referred to in Article 1 shall be carried out by the OPCW Technical Secretariat (the Technical Secretariat). It shall perform that task under the responsibility and the control of the HR. For that purpose, the HR shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the Technical Secretariat.
Article 3
1. The financial reference amount for the implementation of the project referred to in Article 1 shall be EUR 2151823.
2. The expenditure financed by the amount set out in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the general budget of the Union.
3. The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the expenditure referred to in paragraph 2. For that purpose, it shall conclude the necessary agreement with the Technical Secretariat. That agreement shall stipulate that the Technical Secretariat is to ensure visibility of the Union contribution, commensurate with its size, and specify measures to facilitate the development of synergies and to avoid the duplication of activities.
4. The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the agreement referred to in paragraph 3 as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Decision. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the agreement.
Article 4
The HR shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision on the basis of regular reports prepared by the Technical Secretariat. The HR reports shall form the basis for the evaluation carried out by the Council. The Commission shall provide information on the financial aspects of the project referred to in Article 1.
Article 5
1. This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.
2. This Decision shall expire 24 months after the date of conclusion of the agreement referred to in Article 3(3). However, it shall expire six months after its entry into force if that agreement has not been concluded by that time.
Done at Luxembourg, 21 June 2021. For the Council The President J. Borrell Fontelles
ANNEX
ANNEX PROJECT DOCUMENT
1. Background The OPCW is required to maintain infrastructure that permits information sovereignty in a manner commensurate with privileged access classifications, appropriate handling routines and existing threats whilst remaining capable of defending against emerging risks. The OPCW continues to consistently face serious and emerging risks in relation to cyber-security and cyber-resilience. The OPCW is a target of highly skilled, resourced and motivated actors. These actors continue to attack the confidentiality and integrity of the OPCW’s information and infrastructure assets on a frequent basis. To respond to the concerns that recent cyber-attacks, current political considerations, and COVID-19 crisis underlined, and taking into account the unique requirements posed by the nature of the work of the OPCW to deliver on the mandate of the CWC, it is clear that essential investment in technical capabilities is necessary. Under the OPCW’s Special Fund for CyberSecurity, Business Continuity, and Physical Infrastructure Security, the OPCW has designed its Cyber Security and Resilience and Information Assurance Programme (OPCW Programme) with 47 activities to address cyber security challenges that have been experienced in recent times. The OPCW Programme is aligned to best practice as promoted by entities such as the European Union Agency for Cyber Security (ENISA) or using concepts related to the European Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems (NIS) pertaining to Telecoms and Defence. Collectively the OPCW Programme covers the following thematic areas: classified and unclassified networks; policy and governance; detection and response; operations and maintenance; and telecommunications. Fundamentally the OPCW Programme is designed to enable OPCW to reduce opportunities for well-resourced and/or state-sponsored attackers to achieve their aims, and to mitigate risks from both external and insider threats from both a human and technical perspective. The Union support is structured as a Project of three activities that corresponds to two of the 47 OPCW Programme’s activities.
2. Project Purpose The overall purpose of the Project is to ensure that the OPCW Secretariat has the capacity to maintain appropriate level of cyber security and resilience in addressing recurrent and emerging cyber-security defence challenges at OPCW headquarters and auxiliary facilities, to enable delivery of OPCW’s mandate and effective implementation of the CWC.
3. Objectives
Upgrading ICT infrastructure in line with OPCW’s institutional business continuity framework, with a strong focus on resilience;
Ensuring privileged access governance, as well as physical, logical and cryptographic information management and separation for all strategic and mission networks.
4. Results Expected results the Project contributes to are as follows:
ICT equipment and services deliver robust system reliability (hybrid/geographical redundancy) and facilitate increased availability of ICT systems and services in support of business continuity;
Minimization of abilities for any single factor or person to adversely impact confidentiality and integrity of information or systems within the OPCW.
5. Activities
5.
5.1. Activity 1 – Operationalisation of an enabling environment for on-going cyber security and resilience efforts within multi-site OPCW operations This activity seeks to ensure an enabling environment for smooth roll out of OPCW business continuity planning as related to cyber security and resilience. This will be achieved through addressing infrastructure upgrades – re-architecture and/or archival for OPCW business continuity across multi-site operations. As well as further facilitating and enabling the integration of privileged access governance into the business continuity planning and response processes.
5.2. Activity 2 – Designing of customized solution for on premise and cloud based systems integration and configuration with OPCW ICT systems and Privileged Access Management (PAM) solutions This activity focuses on translating the enabling environment into a customized design for on premise and cloud based systems integration and configuration with OPCW ICT systems and PAM solutions. This is expected to increase the efficiency of ICT systems infrastructure and lead to the design of an integrated PAM system for critical assets that can deter, detect, and is in line with commensurate threat hunting capabilities.
5.3. Activity 3 – Initiation and testing of PAM solutions This activity builds upon the infrastructure implemented and the PAM solutions designed to take integration and configuration from theory towards practice. Systems have to be mapped, profiled, and embedded into existing systems while taking associated policy and human factors into consideration. After which thorough testing verifies and assures the robustness of the system (all new systems have strong authentication for users and devices, appropriate information classification and protection, and advanced data loss prevention) in implementation and over time, will enable the OPCW Secretariat to identify and address gaps to the extent possible.
6. Duration The total estimated duration of implementation funded through this project are expected to be incurred and concluded over a 24-month period.
7. Beneficiaries Beneficiaries from the project will be OPCW Technical Secretariat personnel, policy-making organs, subsidiary bodies and CWC stakeholders including States Parties.
8. EU Visibility The OPCW shall take all appropriate measures, within reasonable security considerations, to publicise the fact that this project has been funded by the Union.
Versions
Cited by
- Definitive adoption (EU, Euratom) 2024/207 of the European Union’s annual budget for the financial year 2024 Act · Grade B
This appropriation is intended to provide funds for comprehensive Union actions to limit and manage impacts of climate change on vulnerable populations in developing countries, including displaced persons in the context of disasters and climate change. Assigned revenue (origin, estimated amounts and corresponding article or item of the statement of revenue). Other assigned revenue 100000 6 5 0 1 COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY Title Chapter Article Item Heading FF 2024 appropriations 2023 appropriations 2022 out-turn % Payments 2022/2024 Commitments Payments Commitments Payments Commitments
- Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1984 of 15 July 2024 in support of the Institutional Transitional Planning for Non-Routine Missions and Investigative Capacities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Decision · Grade B
Since 2004, the Union has supported the activities of the OPCW through the following Joint Actions and Council Decisions: Council Joint Action 2004/797/CFSP; Council Joint Action 2005/913/CFSP; Council Joint Action 2007/185/CFSP; Council Joint Action 2007/185/CFSP; Council Decision 2009/569/CFSP; Council Decision 2012/166/CFSP; Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/259; Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/538; Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1026 amended by Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1515; Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2073 and Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1344.
- Definitive adoption (EU, Euratom) 2022/182 of the European Union’s general budget for the financial year 2022 Act · Grade B
This appropriation is intended to provide funds for comprehensive Union actions to limit and manage impacts of climate change on vulnerable populations in developing countries, including displaced persons in the context of disasters and climate change. COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY Title Chapter Article Item Heading FF Appropriations 2022 Appropriations 2021 Outturn 2020 % Payments 2020/2022 Commitments Payments Commitments Payments Commitments Payments 14 04COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY 14 04 01Civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 14 04 01 01 EULEX Kosovo 6 82122069 82
- Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1515 of 20 July 2023 amending Decision (CFSP) 2021/1026 in support of the Cyber Security and Resilience and Information Assurance Programme of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Decision · Grade B
On 21 June 2021, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2021/1026.
- Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1515 of 20 July 2023 amending Decision (CFSP) 2021/1026 in support of the Cyber Security and Resilience and Information Assurance Programme of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Decision · Grade B
The ongoing implementation of Decision (CFSP) 2021/1026 does not have any additional financial implications for the period until 30 August 2024.
- Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1515 of 20 July 2023 amending Decision (CFSP) 2021/1026 in support of the Cyber Security and Resilience and Information Assurance Programme of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Decision · Grade B
Decision (CFSP) 2021/1026 should therefore be amended accordingly,
- Definitive adoption (EU, Euratom) 2023/278 of the European Union’s annual budget for the financial year 2023 Act · Grade B
This appropriation is intended to provide funds for comprehensive Union actions to limit and manage impacts of climate change on vulnerable populations in developing countries, including displaced persons in the context of disasters and climate change. Assigned revenue (origin, estimated amounts and corresponding article or item of the statement of revenue). Other assigned revenue 100000 6 5 0 1 COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY Title Chapter Article Item Heading FF Appropriations 2023 Appropriations 2022 Outturn 2021 % Payments 2021/2023 Commitments Payments Commitments Payments Commitments
- Annual Progress Report on the implementation of the European Union Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2021) 2022/C 310/01 Notice · Grade B
The IAEA also continued to successfully implement Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/2001 of 15 November 2016 on the EU contribution to the establishment and secure management of a Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) Bank under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the framework of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, together with Additional Protocols, constitute the current verification standard, and the EU continues to call for universal adherence to them. The close cooperation between EURATOM and the IAEA
- Annual Progress Report on the implementation of the European Union Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2021) 2022/C 310/01 Notice · Grade B
Title Objective and implementing entity Budget and duration 1. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/579 of 8 April 2021 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/615 on Union support for activities leading up to the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Extension of the implementation period of a previously adopted Council Decision, due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Implementing Agency: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) Budget: EUR 0 OJ L 123, 9.4.2021, p. 21 2. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/648 of 16 April 2021 amending Decision (CFSP
- Annual Progress Report on the Implementation of the European Union Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2022) C/2023/383 Notice · Grade B
Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/1026 of 21 June 2021 in support of the Cyber Security and Resilience and Information Assurance Programme of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Objective: Upgrading ICT infrastructure in line with the OPCW’s institutional business continuity framework, with a strong focus on resilience, and ensuring privileged access governance, as well as physical, logical and cryptographic information management and separation for all strategi