Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/1357 of 15 June 2026 amending Decision (CFSP) 2023/891 concerning restrictive measures in view of actions destabilising the Republic of Moldova
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Address https://gelex.eu/eli/EU/decision/2026/1357@2026-06-15/en
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Whereas:
(1) On 28 April 2023, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2023/891.
(2) The Union remains unwavering in its support for the Republic of Moldova and its resilience, security, stability, economy and energy supply in the face of destabilising activities by external actors.
(3) In view of the situation in the Republic of Moldova, the Council considers that six persons should be added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies set out in the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2023/891.
(4) Decision (CFSP) 2023/891 should therefore be amended accordingly,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Article 1
The Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2023/891 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.
Article 2
This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
Done at Luxembourg, 15 June 2026. For the Council The President K. Kallas
ANNEX
ANNEX
In the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2023/891, the following entries are added under the heading A. Natural persons: Name Identifying information Statement of reasons Date of listing 24. Alina JUC Function: Coordinator in Ilan Shor’s disinformation network DOB: 5.11.2000 POB: Rîbnița, Republic of Moldova Gender: female Nationality: Republic of Moldova Alina Juc was a network coordinator in a secret Russian-funded operation linked to Ilan Shor and aimed at disrupting the parliamentary elections of September 2025. She was tasked with recruiting, coordinating and offering payments for disinformation activities carried out through the network. The disinformation campaign was ongoing before the 2025 parliamentary elections with the purpose of boosting Ilan Shor’s proxies by carrying out polling activities meant to distort the electoral reality. Alina Juc works within a broader structure built around a non-governmental association, Evrazia, the vehicle through which recruitment, training, propaganda dissemination and field networks were organised. Within that architecture, she acts as a coordinator executing Evrazia’s programmes in the Republic of Moldova, thereby connecting local electoral manipulation efforts to the Shor-linked network and Evrazia-linked network. Through recruitment, operational direction, payment coordination and strategy execution, Alina Juc played a central role in implementing a campaign of disinformation and election-disruption objectives. Therefore, she is responsible for, and implementing actions which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law and stability in the Republic of Moldova, by obstructing and undermining the democratic political process, including by obstructing and seriously undermining the holding of elections and attempting to overthrow the constitutional order in the Republic of Moldova. Furthermore, she is associated with Ilan Shor and Evrazia. 15.6.2026 25. Anton TREGUB (Антон ТРЕГУБ) Function: Political party curator DOB: 8.3.1986 POB: Goryachy Klyuch, Krasnodar, USSR (now Russian Federation) Gender: male Nationality: Russian Anton Tregub is a Russian national who is acting as a curator from Moscow for the Moldova Mare political party in the Republic of Moldova. The compilation of the candidate list and electoral strategy of the Moldova Mare party were directed by Anton Tregub. In this sense, Anton Tregub controlled the compilation of the candidate list, warning Victoria Furtună, the leader of the Moldova Mare party, to secure the registration of the party for the elections, encouraging her to bribe the Central Electoral Commission, if needed. Anton Tregub also discussed and agreed with Victoria Furtună to offer goods to prisoners in exchange for votes, as well as forcing prisoners to vote for her party in the parliamentary elections of September 2025. On 26 September 2025, the Moldova Mare party was excluded from participating in the parliamentary elections because of illegal financing and voter buying. By controlling the strategy of the Moldova Mare political party and his direct involvement in illegally obtaining votes for Victoria Furtună in the 2025 parliamentary elections, Anton Tregub is responsible for, and implementing actions which undermine and threaten democracy, the rule of law or stability in the Republic of Moldova, by obstructing and undermining the democratic political process, including by obstructing and seriously undermining the holding of elections and attempting to overthrow the constitutional order in the Republic of Moldova. 15.6.2026 26. Anton USOV (Антон УСОВ) Function: Activist in the Popular Front – Putin’s Team DOB: 3.4.1986 POB: Vladimir, USSR (now Russian Federation) Gender: male Nationality: Russian Anton Usov is an activist in the Popular Front – Putin’s Team, who infiltrated the church structures of the Republic of Moldova, coordinating a structured influence campaign targeting the country’s parliamentary elections of 2025. He oversaw messaging, clergy mobilisation and political alignment within the Diocese of Soroca and Drochia. He used religious platforms, particularly the Salt and Light Telegram channel and the print outlet Salt and Light, to disseminate narratives blending Orthodox discourse with political messaging, while instructing priests how and for whom parishioners should vote. Anton Usov implemented mechanisms of operational control and electoral mobilisation by surveying priests to assess political loyalty, conditioning financial assistance on compliance, facilitating payments through Russian channels and requiring loyalty photos of parish gatherings to report activity back to Moscow. He is further accused of organising systematic collection of believers’ personal data during religious events, pilgrimages and church programmes in order to build voter databases for targeted mobilisation. By acting as a strategic intermediary between Russian political structures and segments of the clergy in the Republic of Moldova, using religious authority, financial leverage, and coordinated digital messaging to influence the democratic electoral processes, Anton Usov is responsible for, and implementing actions and policies which undermine and threaten democracy, the rule of law and stability in the Republic of Moldova, through actions obstructing and undermining the democratic political process, including by obstructing and seriously undermining the holding of elections in the Republic of Moldova. 15.6.2026 27. Irina VLAH Function: Leader of the Inima Moldovei political party; former Bashkan of Gagauzia (2015-2023) DOB: 27.2.1974 POB: Comrat, SSR Moldova (now Republic of Moldova) Gender: female Nationality: Republic of Moldova Irina Vlah is the leader of the Inima Moldovei political party. She was actively engaged in activities aimed at destabilising the democratic processes taking place in the Republic of Moldova ahead of the September 2025 parliamentary elections. Irina Vlah undertook documented visits to Moscow in 2025, alongside listed person Victoria Furtună. The two met with high-ranking Russian officials, where they received assurances regarding campaign support and electoral coordination instructions. Following the formation of a new political bloc, the patriotic political bloc, Irina Vlah co-organised a paid election rally in July 2025, feigning public support for the newly formed bloc. Irina Vlah and her party are controlled by listed person Ilan Shor, and have taken over a number of functions that are no longer performed by the proxy parties that had been outlawed or barred from elections. By undermining the democratic political process, including by attempting to destabilise and overthrow the constitutional order, Irina Vlah is responsible for, and implementing actions and policies which undermine and threaten the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Moldova, and democracy, the rule of law, stability and security in the Republic of Moldova. She is also associated with Ilan Shor. 15.6.2026 28. Iuri VITNEANSKI Function: Member of the Renaștere political party DOB: 6.8.1989 POB: Bălți, SSR Moldova (now Republic of Moldova) Gender: male Nationality: Republic of Moldova Iuri Vitneanski is a member of the Renaștere political party, which is part of the Victory/Pobeda political bloc. He actively engages in the dissemination of disinformation and scare tactics, as well as recurring narratives about supposed threats to the neutrality or the militarisation of the Republic of Moldova. Iuri Vitneanski acts under the supervision of listed person Ilan Shor, from whom he receives monthly pay. Iuri Vitneanski also participates in public actions coordinated by listed entity Evrazia, a non-governmental association. Iuri Vitneanski has taken part in several meetings alongside multiple individuals from Ilan Shor’s entourage. By undermining the democratic political process, including by attempting to destabilise and overthrow the constitutional order, Iuri Vitneanski is implementing and supporting actions and policies which undermine and threaten democracy, the rule of law and stability in the Republic of Moldova. He is also associated with Ilan Shor, the Victory/Pobeda political bloc and Evrazia. 15.6.2026 29. Ruslan GARBALÎ Function: Head of Vulcănești territorial organisation of the Renaștere political party DOB: 3.6.1970 POB: Ceadîr-Lunga, SSR Moldova (now Republic of Moldova) Gender: male Nationality: Republic of Moldova Ruslan Garbalî is the Head of the Vulcănești territorial organisation of the Renaștere political party in the Republic of Moldova. He was involved in organising paid protests in anticipation of the parliamentary elections of 2025. The protests were announced by Ilan Shor, and Ruslan Garbalî had the executive role of contacting the participants and ensuring they were paid. Moreover, he participated in the launch event for the Victory/Pobeda political bloc, alongside Ilan Shor. By undermining the democratic political process, including by attempting to destabilise or overthrow the constitutional order, Ruslan Garbalî is supporting actions and policies which undermine and threaten democracy, the rule of law, and stability in the Republic of Moldova. He is also associated with Ilan Shor. 15.6.2026
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